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INTRODUCTION 
Petitioner and Appellant G&C Case Family Trust, Gordon and Claudia Case, 
Trustees ("Case Family Trust"), appeals from the Judgment and Order of the lower court 
entered in this matter on February 17, 2005 (Attachment 1 hereto), sustained by its Order 
Denying Petitioner's Motion to Amend Findings, Conclusions and Judgment entered June 
30, 2005 (Attachment 2 hereto). By its orders, the trial court established a boundary line 
between a Utah County property owned by the Case Family Trust and that owned by 
Respondents/ Appellees Ronald and Geraldine Jensen ("Jensens"), locating the line one 
foot to the east of the eastern edge of an irrigation canal lying wholly within the record 
boundaries of the Case Family Trust's property, under the doctrine of "boundary by 
acquiescence." In so holding, the trial court ruled that, as a matter of law (and without the 
benefit of evidence or trial), Jensens had established all necessary elements of boundary 
by acquiescence at that location, entitling them to claim not only the irrigation ditch (and 
one foot of land to the east thereof), but a portion of property to the west of the ditch, to 
all of which the Case Family Trust owned record title - as well as a strip of property lying 
between the two properties to which neither the Case Family Trust nor the Jensens held 
title. 
In fact, there was ample evidence before the trial court to establish genuine issues 
of material fact precluding a summary judgment finding of boundary by acquiescence, 
thereby defeating the Case Family Trust's record title to its property. The status of the 
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canal itself as an irrigation easement for the benefit of both parties (as well as other 
property owners located to the south); the lack of acquiescence by the Case Family Trust 
(or its predecessors in interest) in the east bank of the canal as the boundary line of their 
property; the placement of historic fences to the west of the irrigation ditch to mark the 
boundary line; the existence of a 1941 boundary line agreement between the parties' 
respective predecessors in interest establishing a line to the west of the irrigation ditch as 
the boundary line between the properties; and the fact that the record descriptions of the 
parties' respective parcels do not adjoin, each operate to defeat applicability of the 
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. Taken together, they clearly establish that the 
court committed reversible error in granting summary judgment. 
JURISDICTION BASIS FOR APPEAL 
This is an appeal from a final order of the Fourth Judicial District Court for Utah 
County, State of Utah, establishing a common boundary line between property owned by 
the Case Family Trust and property owned by the Jensens, under the doctrine of boundary 
by acquiescence. Jurisdiction obtains pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ 78-2a-3(2)(j). The 
appeal was referred to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(5). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court erred in finding that, as a matter of law, Jensens 
have occupied and used the land west of, and to a point one foot east of the east bank of, 
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the concrete irrigation ditch for residential and agricultural purposes for a period of more 
than 20 years. 
2. Whether the trial court erred in finding that, as a matter of law, the east 
bank of the irrigation ditch was a visible line marking the boundary between the Case 
Property and the Jensen Property for a period of more than 20 years. 
3. Whether Jensens and the Case Family Trust mutually acquiesced in 
Jensens' use and occupancy of all portions of the Case Property to the west of the eastern 
edge of the irrigation ditch, and to the establishment of a line one foot east of the east 
bank of the concrete irrigation ditch as the boundary between their respective properties, 
for a period of more than 20 years. 
4. Whether the trial court erred in finding that, as a matter of law, the 
Boundary Agreement between the parties' predecessors-in-interest that established the 
boundary line between the G&C Property and the Jensen Property to lie to the west of the 
irrigation ditch, was ineffective to bind the parties. 
All of the foregoing issues were preserved in the Case Family Trust memoranda 
before the trial court: R. 95-108; 169-176; 183-186. 
The standard of review for all of the foregoing issues is that applicable to orders 
granting summary judgment generally - the decision is reviewed for correctness, 
affording no deference to the trial court's decision. Schurtz v. BMW of North America, 
Inc., 814 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1991); Springville Citizens for a Better Community v. City of 
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Springville, 1999 Utah 25, 979 P.2d 332. The court reviews the record, and construes all 
facts in the light most favorable to defendant/appellant, and sustains the lower court's 
ruling only if, as a matter of law, no genuine issue of material fact existed precluding 
entry of summary judgment. Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991); 
Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Garfield County, 811 P.2d 184 (Utah 
1991). 
CITATION OF DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-1 - Water Is Declared Property of the Public 
All waters in this state, whether above or under the ground, are hereby 
declared to be the property of the public, subject to all existing rights to the 
use thereof. 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-6 - Eminent Domain - Purposes 
Any person shall have a right of way across and upon public, private and 
corporate lands, or other rights of way, for the construction, maintenance, 
repair and use of all necessary reservoirs, dams, water gates, canals, ditches, 
flumes, tunnels, pipe lines and areas for setting up pumps and pumping 
machinery or other means of securing, storing, replacing and conveying 
water for domestic, culinary, industrial and irrigation purposes or for any 
necessary public use, or for drainage, upon payment of just compensation 
therefore, but such right of way shall in all cases be exercised in a manner 
not unnecessarily to impair the practical use of any other right of way, 
highway or public or private road, or to injure any public or private 
property. 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-14 - Interfering with Water Works or with Apportioning 
Official - Penalty and Liability 
(1) Any person, who in any way unlawfully interferes with, 
injures, destroys or removes any dam, head gate, wier, casing, valve, cap or 
other appliances for the diversion, apportionment, measurement or 
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regulation of water, or who interferes with any person authorized to 
apportion water while in the discharge of his duties, is guilty of a crime 
punishable under § 73-2-27. 
(2) Any person who commits an act defined as a crime under this 
section is also liable in a civil action for damages or other relief to any 
person injured by that act. 
(3) (a) A civil action under this section may be brought 
independent of a criminal action. 
(b) Proof of the elements of a civil action under this 
section need only be made by a preponderance of the evidence. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Case Family Trust filed its Complaint in this action on September 26, 2003 
(R0001-0004), seeking to quiet title in and to a parcel of property located in Benjamin, 
Utah County, State of Utah ("Case Property"), free and clear from any claim of right, title 
or interest asserted by Jensens. Jensens counterclaimed on October 21, 2003 (R0019-
0026), claiming a boundary line to their property (located to the west of the Case Family 
Trust property, "Jensen Property") extending approximately 109 feet to the east of an 
irrigation ditch lying within the west record boundary line of the Case Property; in the 
alternative, that the eastern edge of the irrigation ditch be deemed the boundary line 
between the parties' respective properties under the doctrine of boundary by 
acquiescence; and for an order of the court that Jensens have prescriptive right to use the 
head gates on the western edge of the irrigation ditch. 
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Jensens moved for summary judgment on June 28, 2004 (R0039-0040). In their 
motions, Jensens abandoned their claim that they owned 109 feet to the east of the 
irrigation ditch, but sought to establish, as a matter of law, that their property extended to 
the eastern edge of the irrigation ditch (i.e., within the Case Family Trust's record 
boundary line) under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence (R0041-0052). Following 
discovery, the Case Family Trust filed its opposition to Jensens' Motion for Summary 
Judgment on October 22, 2004 (R0094). In opposition to Jensens' Motion, the Case 
Family Trust submitted an affidavit of Claudia Case; an affidavit of surveyor Donald 
Clair Allen; affidavits of John Lindstrom, Ronald T. Ludlow (both of whom had given 
affidavits to Jensens in support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, but who modified 
their testimony by supplemental affidavit), the affidavit of John McDonald (a neighboring 
property owner and water user), and depositions of Neil Anderson and Patricia H. 
Mitchell. 
Counsel presented oral argument on November 29, 2004 (R0202). At the 
conclusion of argument, the court ruled from the bench that, as a matter of law, all 
elements of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence had been established, sufficient to 
constitute the east bank of the irrigation ditch the boundary between the parties' 
respective properties. The court directed the parties to submit survey information to 
establish the legal description of the boundary lines location (R0157). 
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Thereafter, a telephonic status conference occurred between the court and counsel 
on January 12, 2005 (ROl59), pursuant to which the court directed Jensens' counsel to 
furnish a boundary line establishing the boundary between the properties, not on the 
eastern edge of the irrigation ditch, but one foot to the east of the ditch's edge (apparently 
to permit Jensens to erect a fence thereon). In accordance therewith, Jensens' counsel 
submitted, and the court signed, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (ROl 61-0163, 
Attachment 3 hereto), and a Judgment and Order (ROl64-0165, Attachment 1 hereto), 
both entered on February 17, 2005. By its Findings, Conclusions and Order, the court 
quieted title, in the Case Family Trust, in and to only those portions of its record title 
property lying more than one foot to the east of the irrigation ditch, granting to Jensens 
title to all portions of the Case Property lying to the west thereof. 
On March 4, 2005, the Case Family Trust filed a Motion to Alter or Amend 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment or Order (ROl 68). By order dated 
June 30, 2005, the lower court denied the Case Family Trust's Motion to Amend 
Findings, Conclusions and Judgment (R0191-0192, Attachment 2 hereto). 
The Case Family Trust filed its Notice of Appeal on July 19, 2005 (ROl 93-0194, 
Attachment 4 hereto). By order dated July 26, 2005 (ROl96), the Utah Supreme Court 
transferred this matter to the Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4). 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
5. Gordon and Claudia Case, as Trustees of the G&C Case Family Trust, 
Petitioner and Appellant herein ("Case Family Trust"), are the owners of property located 
at 3535 West 7550 South, Benjamin, Utah County, State of Utah. Affidavit of Claudia 
Case (R0113-0115) at 12. 
6. The property at the above address (hereafter "Case Property") is more 
particularly described as follows: 
Commencing 19.286 chains North and 1.609 chains East of the South 
Quarter Corner of Section 29, Township 8 South, Range 2 East of the Salt 
Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 0°8f East 15.044 chains; thence 
North 18°38f East 0.274 chains; thence North 0°24f East 9.990 chains; 
thence North 89°59f East 9.990 chains; thence South 0°15' West 25.267 
chains; thence South 89°49* West 10.072 chains to the place of beginning. 
Affidavit of Gordon and Claudia Case in Support of Motion for TRO and/or Preliminary 
Injunction (R0006-0009) at H 2. 
7. The Case Family Trust purchased the Case Property from Patricia Mitchell 
and Diane Nielsen on September 12, 2002, taking by warranty deed. Id. at % 1; Depo. of 
Patricia Mitchell (R. 137-151) at p. 4 and Exhibit 1 thereto. 
8. The Case Family Trust's transferors, Patricia Mitchell and Diane Nielsen, 
had inherited the Case Property from their father, who had owned and fanned the 
1
 In accordance with this Court's standard of review, the following facts are stated in a 
light most favorable to the position of the Case Family Trust, as the non-moving party 
before the trial court. All statements of fact are supported by admissions in the pleadings 
or otherwise by statements and exhibits in the record. 
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property for 40-50 years prior to his death. Depo. of Patricia H. Mitchell (R0137-0151) at 
P-5. 
9. As transferor, Patricia Mitchell had no understanding or belief that she was 
unable, or not intending, to transfer all of the Case Property as described in the deed. Id. 
at p. 6-8. 
10. The description on the warranty deed was believed to have come from the 
transferors' tax records. Id. at p. 9. 
11. The Case Property is bounded on the north by an irrigation ditch belonging 
to the Spanish Fork South Irrigation Company. Affidavit of Claudia Case (ROl 13-0115) 
at Uf 3 and 4. 
12. At a certain point, the irrigation ditch turns south, runs the length of the 
Case Property from north to south, and onto neighboring lands to the south of the Case 
Property. Id. 
13. The Case Family Trust owns water rights from the Spanish Fork South 
Irrigation Company, and may divert those rights at any point along the ditch. Id. 
14. The Spanish Fork South Irrigation Company has recorded four (4) water 
easements on the Case Property. The irrigation ditch, as it bounds the Case Property to 
the north and crosses it on the west side, is subject to these easements. Affidavit of 
Donald Clair Allen-Surveyor (R0109-0112) at f 5. 
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15. Upon acquiring the Case Property, the Case Family Trust caused it to be 
surveyed. Id. at % 3. 
16. The surveyor learned that the western boundary of the Case Property lies to 
the west of the irrigation ditch. Id. at % 4. 
17. From 1966 until the fall of 2002, the Case Property was farmed by Ronald 
T. Ludlow, brother-in-law to Patricia H. Mitchell. Depo. of Patricia H. Mitchell (R0137-
0151) at p. 5; Affidavit of Ronald T. Ludlow (R0118-0121) at fflf 3-4. 
18. Mr. Ludlow farmed and worked the Case Property to the edge of the 
irrigation ditch on the west - not because he believed, or had been given to understand, 
that the irrigation ditch marked the western boundary of the property, but because the 
property to the west thereof was inaccessible. Affidavit of Ronald T. Ludlow 
(R0118-0121) UK 13-17. 
19. Mr. Ludlow, though, never understood the boundary to the Case Property 
to lie on the east bank of the ditch. Id. at f 14. 
20. The northern segment of the irrigation ditch crossing the Case Property was 
lined with concrete by the Spanish Fork Irrigation Company in the spring of 1967. Id. at 
f 7. The section of the irrigation ditch running from north to south along the west side of 
the Case Property was lined with concrete by Raynold Jensen (father to 
Defendant/Appellee Ronald Jensen) and Arthur Hansen (a neighbor to the south of the 
Case Property), consistent with the practice of the irrigation company of permitting water 
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users to maintain the ditch in areas where there are only a few remaining users holding 
water rights. Id. at ffi| 10-12; Affidavit of John Lindstrom (R0116-0117) at f 7. 
21. Defendants and Appellees Ronald and Geraldine Jensen own and occupy 
property to the west of the Case Property, which they received via warranty deed from 
Ronald S. Jensen dated February 9, 1999, recorded as Entry 15109 of Book 4968, p. 256 
of the Real Property Records of Utah County, State of Utah. Complaint (ROO 13-0015) at 
K 8; Answer (R0019-0026) at f 8. 
22. The Jensen Property is more fully described as follows: 
Commencing 1 Chain East of the center of Section 29, Township 8 South, 
Range 2 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 4.66 chains 
thence West 20.40 chains; thence South 4.66 chains; thence East 7.28 
chains; thence South 5.84 chains; thence East 14.22 chains; thence North 
5.44 chains to the place of beginning. 
Complaint (R0006-0009) at K 9; Answer (ROO 19-0026) at f 9.2 
23. The Case Property and the Jensen Property are not contiguous, nor do their 
record boundaries adjoin one another; rather, there is a gap between them. Affidavit of 
Don Clair Allen-Surveyor (R0109-0112) at HI 6 and 9. 
24. A parcel of property located just south of the Jensen Property, and bordered 
on the east by the Case Property, is currently owned by an individual named Roberts. 
Affidavit of Don Clair Allen-Surveyor (R0109-0112) atfl 7. 
2
 In their Answer, Jensens claimed to have received "additional property which is not 
described in Petitioner's Complaint"; however, this claim was never substantiated by 
affidavit or other evidence of record in this case. 
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25. The Roberts Property is fenced where it adjoins the Jensen Property and the 
Case Property; the fence on the Roberts-Case border is located west of the irrigation ditch 
by several feet. Id. 
26. If a person stands at the northeast corner of the Roberts Property and looks 
northward along the western most surveyed boundary line of the Case Property, he/she 
will see trees along the Jensen parcel directly in line with the surveyed boundary, 
suggesting the existence of a fence line at one time. Affidavit of Claudia Case 
(R0113-0115) at 1f 10. 
27. Prior to its current ownership, the Roberts Property was owned by John 
McDonald. Affidavit of John McDonald (R0122-0123) at % 2. 
28. During the time that he owned the Roberts Property, John McDonald 
observed a small fence occasionally put up by Jensens to contain cattle; the fence was 
placed on the west side of the irrigation ditch. Id. at f 4. 
29. In 1941, a boundary agreement was recorded with the Utah County 
Recorder's Office in Book 361, p. 255, purporting to establish a boundary between the 
Case Property and the Jensen Property. Affidavit of Donald Clair Allen-Surveyor 
(R0109-0112)at1[8. 
30. The purpose of the boundary agreement was to declare a fence line to be the 
boundary between the parcels. Id. 
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31. The described location of the fence line places the entire Jensen Property 
west of both the existing irrigation ditch and the western record boundary of the Case 
Property. Id. 
32. By virtue of the trial court's ruling, the Case Family Trust has lost more 
than a strip of land - under governing law, Utah County's willingness to permit future 
subdivision of the Case Property has been compromised due to lack of sufficient acreage. 
Affidavit of Claudia Case (R. 0113-0115) atf 11. " 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court's Order Granting Summary Judgment rested on a finding that, as a 
matter of law, Jensens had established a line, located one foot to the east of the east bank 
of a north-south irrigation ditch on the Case property, as the boundary between the Case 
and Jensen properties. In so holding, the trial court found that Jensens had established 
each element required under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence: 
(1) occupation up to a visible line marked by monuments, fences, or buildings; 
(2) mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary; 
(3) for a long period of time; 
(4) by adjoining land owners. 
In fact, Jensens established none of these elements. 
Jensens did not demonstrate "occupation" of the disputed area, other than to claim 
that they shared (with a downstream neighbor) in the cost of lining the irrigation ditch in 
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1967, and that they ran irrigation water from the ditch to their property thereafter. 
Maintenance of the irrigation ditch, however, was part and parcel of the obligation of 
Jensens (together with other irrigation company shareholders) to maintain the ditch, and 
was not done by them alone. Access to the ditch, and use of irrigation water, is a right 
granted by state law, and cannot be seen as "occupancy" of the underlying property within 
the meaning of the doctrine. The line established by the court, moreover, was not marked 
by any "monuments, fences or buildings." It was not marked by anything. It was a 
randomly-chosen line lying to the east of an existing irrigation ditch - which, in and of 
itself, has been rejected by Utah case law as a proper "visible line" for purposes of 
boundary by acquiescence. 
Jensens failed to show mutual acquiescence in the established line as a boundary. 
A party claiming boundary by acquiescence must show not only use and occupancy up to 
a physical line, but mutual acquiescence in that line as a boundary. In fact, there was a 
complete failure of proof in this regard; moreover, the Case Family Trust offered 
significant proof that the parties did not regard any line east of the irrigation ditch as the 
common boundary line between the properties. Certainly, no evidence placed any 
mutually-acquiesced-in line one foot east of the irrigation ditch. Jensens may not rely (as 
the trial court apparently found) on the Case Family Trust's non-user of property to the 
west of the irrigation ditch in this regard - by undisputed testimony, property to the west 
of the irrigation ditch was inaccessible to the Case Family Trust and its predecessors in 
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interest, and its non-user cannot constitute acquiescence. Finally, the parties' 
predecessors in interest expressly located the boundary between the properties by an 
agreement recorded in 1941. Where a boundary line is expressly found by agreement, no 
post-agreement conduct may arise to the level of acquiescence in a different boundary 
line. 
Since no physical boundary was established, no occupation up to that line was 
shown, and no acquiescence in the line as a boundary was demonstrated, no conduct on 
behalf of either the Case Family Trust or the Jensens persisted for the requisite period of 
time (20 years), in order to establish boundary by acquiescence. 
Finally, the Case Family Trust and Jensens are not "adjoining property owners"-
there is a gap between their properties owned by an undisclosed third party, as established 
by the only survey work of record in the case. In addition, they are separated by the 
easement underlying the irrigation ditch itself, in favor of the Spanish Fork South 
Irrigation Company. Absent contiguity, the requirement that the boundary be established 
between "adjoining landowners" fails, and Jensens' claim in fact implicates property 
rights of un-joined third parties, 
ARGUMENT 
It is important, in passing on the trial court's grant of summary judgment in this 
matter, to begin with those facts which were in fact not disputed by either party. 
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All parties acknowledge that the Case Family Trust received conveyance of the 
Case Property by an otherwise-valid, enforceable warranty deed, recorded as Entry 
No. 107659:2002, in the records of the Utah County Recorder (R.0137). The deed was 
effective to pass record title to all portions of the land described - Utah Code Ann. § 57-
1-12. 
The nature and extent of Jensens' title to the property lying to the west of the Case 
Property is likewise not in dispute. In pleadings, Jensens admitted to the accuracy to the 
legal description contained in the Case Family Trust's Complaint (ROOOl-0004). (In their 
Answer, Jensens represented that they had received conveyance of additional property; 
however, the additional conveyance was never produced, no description of the additional 
property was ever offered, and no evidence of additional land ownership was ever 
presented to the court.) 
Finally, there is no dispute in the record concerning the conclusions reached by the 
sole surveyor offering evidence in this matter. Donald Clair Allen, a certified Utah land 
surveyor, presented his affidavit on October 22, 2004, establishing (without challenge) 
the following: 
• That the western boundary of the Case Property lies west of the irrigation 
ditch located in the northwest portion of the Case Property; 
That the Spanish Fork Irrigation Company has recorded four (4) water 
easements in connection with the irrigation ditch on the Case Property; 
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• That the Jensen Property does not extend to the western edge of the eastern 
(or western) edge of the irrigation ditch running north to south along the 
western portion of the Case Property; 
• That a 1941 Boundary Agreement was recorded with Utah County in 
Book 361, p. 255, establishing a boundary line between the Case Property 
and the Jensen Property, located to the west of the irrigation ditch; and 
• That the Jensen parcel does not even line up contiguous with the western 
edge of the Case Property - that a gap exists between the two, ownership to 
which lies in neither the Case Family Trust nor the Jensens. 
Jensens' motion attempted to sidestep all of the foregoing, though, by reliance on 
the legal doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. After briefing and oral argument, the 
trial court concluded that the Jensens had established, as a matter of law, that the parties 
had acquiesced for the necessary period of time in a boundary line lying one foot to the 
east of the eastern most edge of the irrigation ditch running from north to south along the 
western portion of the Case Property. In order to be sustainable on appeal, the court's 
ruling must be legally correct, giving all due deference to the facts of the case construed 
most favorably to the Case Family Trust (see cases at pp. 3-4, above). 
The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence, first recognized in Utah in 1906 
(Holmes v. Judge, 31 Utah 269, 87 P.2d 1009 (1906)) was crafted as a means of resolving 
boundary disputes where surveys of record did not mirror longstanding practices and 
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understandings. Its purpose is to establish "stability in boundaries, repose of titles, and 
prevention of litigation" -Hales v. Frakes, 600 P.2d 556, 559 (Utah 1979).3 The 
Doctrine was never intended as a vehicle for seizing title to land not validly owned, by 
laying unilateral claim up to a line not mutually understood as a common boundary. 
For this reason, the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence has been narrowly and 
strictly drawn. As stated in Englert v. Zane, 848 P.2d 155 (Utah Ct. App. 1993): 
Utah courts have always restrictively applied this doctrine. 
[Citation omitted.] A party claiming title by acquiescence 
must establish all of the required elements to give rise to a 
presumption of ownership in his or her favor. 
848 P.2d at 168-169. Failure to meet any of the elements of the doctrine defeats the 
boundary as a matter of law. Hales v. Frakes, cited supra, at 559. 
The elements which must be established by a claimant seeking to defeat a 
neighbor's record title by invoking boundary by acquiescence have been stated many 
times. Most recently, this court again articulated the standard as follows: 
The elements of boundary by acquiescence are (i) occupation 
up to a visible line marked by monuments, fences, or 
buildings, (ii) mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary, 
(iii) for a long period of time, (iv) by adjoining land owners. 
Argyle v. Jones, 2005 UT App.346, 118 P.3d 301 at If 3 (quoting Jacobs v. Haven, 917 
P.2d 1078, 1080 (Utah 1996)). 
3
 Given the number of recently-reported cases from Utah's appellate courts dealing 
with boundary by acquiescence, the last purpose enumerated in the Hales decision seems 
not to have been realized. 
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In granting Jensens' Motion for Summary Judgment in this case, then, the trial 
court concluded not only that Jensens presented evidence probative of each of the 
foregoing elements, but established all four beyond the existence of any genuine issue of 
material fact. In fact, the record discloses evidence which, if accepted by the trier of fact, 
would defeat each and every one of the four elements. 
POINT I. JENSENS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE "OCCUPATION" UP TO A 
VISIBLE LINE MARKED BY MONUMENTS, FENCES OR 
BUILDINGS, LYING ONE FOOT TO THE WEST OF THE 
IRRIGATION DITCH'S WEST BANK. 
A. Jensens Presented No Evidence of "Occupancy" Past the Eastern 
Record Boundary of the Jensen Property. 
In support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, Jensens presented affidavits 
from John Lindstrom, Ronald Ludlow and Ronald Jensen. The Court is invited to review 
these affidavits in depth - nowhere do they allege any acts constituting "occupancy" of 
any property east of Jensens' record, deeded boundary line. They do not claim that the 
disputed land was farmed, that it was fenced, that it was improved, or that it was lived on. 
Instead, Jensens claim only (1) participation in lining the irrigation ditch with concrete in 
1967, and (2) the running of irrigation water from the irrigation ditch to the Jensen 
Property - see Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Respondent's 
Motion for Summary Judgment (R0041 -0052) at pp. 2-3. 
The Case Family Trust, by contrast, presented the trial court with competent (and, 
indeed, undisputed) evidence conclusively defeating any claim that such minimal acts 
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constituted "occupancy" to the east edge of the irrigation ditch (or beyond). Mr. Ludlow 
(a prior occupant of the Case Property, who gave affidavits to both sides) testified that the 
north-south leg of the irrigation ditch (upon which Jensens rely as the boundary) was 
maintained by its downstream water recipients, rather than by the Spanish Fork South 
Irrigation Company (which owned the system and issued the water shares), according to 
standard water company practice. Ludlow Affidavit (R.Ol 16-0121) at Tffi 10 and 16. John 
Lindstrom, who has owned and occupied property to the south of the properties in 
dispute, confirmed this member-maintenance obligation (Lindstrom Affidavit, R0116-
0117) at f 7. Mr. Ludlow further testified that the portion of the irrigation ditch now 
relied upon by Jensens as their eastern boundary was lined with concrete, not only by 
Raynold Jensen (Ronald Jensen's father), but by Arthur Hansen, owner of the property to 
the south - Id. at ffif 11 and 12. 
In short, Jensens have no more "occupied" land to the eastern edge of the irrigation 
ditch than did their neighbor to the south, or any other water user drawing from the 
irrigation ditch, incident to the commonly-understood maintenance obligations which 
such users share. The ditch itself is subject to an easement in favor of the Spanish Fork 
South Irrigation Company - see R0095-0098. The actions of Jensens and their neighbors 
in lining the ditch was in furtherance of the easement's primary purpose: the delivery of 
irrigation water to users downstream. It does not and cannot constitute "occupancy" of 
the underlying fee. 
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The fact that Jensens have taken water from the ditch, to irrigate the Jensen 
Property, offers no further aid. Under Utah law, water users are entitled to access the 
ditch in order to utilize their water shares; indeed, any action which the Case Family Trust 
(or its predecessors in interest) could have taken to prevent such access would have 
constituted a criminal act and exposed them to civil liability - Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-14. 
The irrigation ditch is an artificial channel maintained for the benefit of a licensed water 
company, dispersing public waters to shareholders (Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-1). Jensens' 
accessing of water rights, as irrigation company members, puts no one on notice of an 
"occupancy" claim for purposes of boundary by acquiescence. 
In the case of Olsen v. Park Daughters Investment Co., 29 Utah 2d 421, 511 P.2d 
145 (1973) (cited with approval in Englert v. Zane, cited supra), the court stated the 
following: 
Utah courts consider [the doctrine of boundary by 
acquiescence] as a foundational one relating to rights based 
on actual possession of land. 
511 P.2d at 147 (emphasis added). Even if undisputed, Jensens' evidence of "actual 
possession" was inadequate as a matter of law to satisfy the "occupancy" requirement of 
the doctrine; the trial court's finding that occupancy was established as a matter of law, 
even in the face of the Case Family Trust's opposing evidence, was clearly incorrect. 
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B. The Line One Foot East of the East Bank of the Irrigation Ditch was 
not Established, as a Matter of Law, as a "Visible Line Marked by 
Monuments, Fences, or Buildings." 
Consistent with this underlying purpose, the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence 
usually entails the effect of a fence, tree line or other physical marker commonly used by 
adjoining landowners as a boundary line. Unlike a fence, an irrigation ditch is not 
typically used to mark boundaries. In fact, the only reported Utah case in which an 
irrigation ditch was invoked as establishing boundary by acquiescence was Fuoco v. 
Williams, 18 Utah 2d 282, 421 P.2d 944 (1966). Therein, the Utah Supreme Court 
rejected the plaintiffs contention that an irrigation ditch could constitute a physical 
boundary - not only because the ditch was small and unobtrusive (admittedly not the case 
here), but because "a boundary line, to be established by acquiescence, must be definite, 
certain and not speculative." 421 P.2d 946 (citing Thompson On Real Property, § 3036, 
p. 526) . The Court in Fuoco clearly implied that, by its nature, an irrigation ditch is not 
a common enough device to demark boundaries that its invocation satisfies the require-
ments of the doctrine: 
any number of ditches could crisscross one's property for the purpose of 
irrigating land without any contention or realistic assumption that they were 
to be boundary lines" 
41 P.2d at 947. 
The trial court's assumption, based on nothing but the evidence before it, that the 
irrigation ditch here was intended as a "monument" to mark a boundary was clearly 
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speculative, and precluded by Fuoco. Certainly, the trial court engaged in total 
speculation by establishing the east bank of the ditch, on the side opposite Jensens' 
supposed "occupancy" as the "monument" when Jensen had in no way "occupied" to that 
bank.4 
Yet, the trial court went even further. Its order extended the boundary to a line one 
foot east of the eastern most edge of the irrigation ditch - not because there was any 
"monument" at that location, but for the convenience of the Jensens. If on no other basis, 
the trial court's ruling fails on this point alone. 
Jensens did not "occupy", in any sense cognizable under boundary by 
acquiescence, up to any definite and non-speculative "monument". On this basis alone, 
the trial court's ruling depriving the Case Family Trust of its property was error. 
POINT IL JENSENS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT, AS A MATTER OF 
LAW, THE PARTIES MUTUALLY ACQUIESCED IN A POINT 
ONE FOOT EAST OF THE EASTERN EDGE OF THE 
IRRIGATION DITCH AS A BOUNDARY. 
Meager though the evidence was to establish "occupancy" up to a "physical 
monument" (See Point I, above), the evidence of "mutual acquiescence" in that line as a 
boundary was far slimmer. It consisted, essentially, of nothing but one unexplained 
4
 In Englert v. Zane, cited supra, the court recognized a river as a "monument" for 
purposes of boundary by acquiescence; however, the boundary claimants were granted 
their side of the river - not the opposite side - as the boundary. 
725286vl 23 
paragraph of Defendant/Appellee Ronald Jensen's Affidavit, stating only that "myself, 
my family, and the Petitioner's [sic] predecessors in interest have all treated the east bank 
of the concrete irrigation ditch as the existing boundary between our respective parcels of 
property for over forty years' '- Affidavit of Ronald Jensen (R0053-0055) at T[10. By 
contrast, Ronald Ludlow, a prior occupant of the Case Property (who had previously 
given an affidavit seeming to corroborate Mr. Jensen's testimony), clarified with a 
subsequent affidavit that he did not understand, nor had he ever been informed, that the 
eastern bank of the irrigation ditch marked the western boundary of the Case Property; 
further, that he had never worked land further to the west than the east irrigation ditch 
only because land lying to the west thereof was inaccessible. Affidavit of Ronald T. 
Ludlow (R0118-0121) at ^13-17. 
Other evidence was placed before the trial court casting doubt on the concept of 
mutual acquiescence: 
• A view along the western record boundary line of the Case Property shows 
a line of trees on the Jensen parcel directly in line with the survey boundary, 
indicating the past fence line. Affidavit of Claudia Case (R0113-0115) at 
lio; 
• Defendant/Appellee Ronald Jensen, at one point, erected a fence on the 
west side of the irrigation ditch. Affidavit of John McDonald, (R0122-
0123) at K 
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The Roberts Property (to the south of the Jensen Property and west of the 
Case Property) is fenced off from the Case Property on the west of the 
irrigation ditch by several feet. Affidavit of Donald Clair Allen, Surveyor 
(R0109-0112)atf7; 
Most telling, the Parties' predecessors-in-interest to the Case and Jensen 
properties recorded a 1941 agreement, establishing a boundary between the 
properties to the west of the irrigation ditch. Id. at ^ [8. 
With the foregoing facts in mind, the trial court's finding of mutual acquiescence 
in a boundary line not of record fails on three counts. 
A. The Trial Court Was Faced with Circumstantial Evidence Tending to 
Defeat the Assumption of Mutual Acquiescence. 
In the case of Argyle v. Jones cited supra, this Court reiterated and reinforced the 
requirement that mutual acquiescence in a boundary line as a boundary must be 
established before record boundary lines could be defeated. Quoting with approval from 
the case of Glenn v. Whitney, 116 Utah 267, 209 P.2d 257 (1949), the Court stated that 
"the mere fact that a fence happens to be put up and neither party does anything about it 
for a long period of time will not establish it as the true boundary." (2005 UT App. at 
Tf 13). This Court then stated the following: 
Thus, to establish acquiescence, [the Plaintiff] was required to show more 
than inaction on the part of the [Defendants]. However, at trial, [Plaintiff] 
presented no evidence of affirmative actions taken by the [Defendants] after 
1961 that would suggest that they acquiesced in the fence as the boundary 
line. 
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(2005 UT App. 346 at f 14). The Court then observed that, in fact, the record before the 
trial court suggested certain conduct on behalf of the Defendants which would defeat the 
assumption that they acquiesced any non-record boundary line, including "minimal" 
contact with the disputed property; a separate purchase agreement involving the disputed 
property; and payment of taxes on the entire parcel. (2005 UT App. 346 at f 15). 
The Argyle decision echoes requirements of various prior Utah cases establishing 
that "mutual acquiescence" is a two-part inquiry: the party standing to lose ground 
through boundary by acquiescence must acquiesce both in the use of the disputed 
property, and in the physical monument as the common boundary line. In Wilkinson 
Family Farm, LLC v. Babcock, (1999 UT App. 366, 993 P.2d 229), this Court stated the 
following: 
Mutual acquiescence in a line as a boundary has two requirements: that 
both parties recognize the specific line, and that both parties acknowledge 
the line as the demarcation between the properties, [citing Fuoco v. 
Williams, cited supra]. Acquiescence does not require an explicit 
agreement,. . . but recognition and acquiescence must be mutual, and both 
parties must have knowledge of the existence of the line as [the] boundary 
line. 
(1999 UT App. 366 at 1J8, quoting Wright v. Clissold, 521 P.2d 1224, 1227 (Utah 1974) 
(emphasis in original)). See also Mason v. Loveless, 2001 UT App. 145, 24 P.3d 1997 
("A boundary by acquiescence . . . requires more than mere acquiescence in use; it 
requires acquiescence to a line as a boundary" - 2001 UT App. 145 at TJ19); Ault v. 
Holden, 2002 UT 33,44 P.2d 781: 
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Under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence, the party attempting to 
establish a particular line as the boundary between properties must establish 
that the parties mutually acquiesced in the line as separating the 
properties . . . . To do so, the party must show that both parties recognized 
and acknowledged a visible line, such as a fence or building, as the 
boundary line of the adjacent parcels. 
2002 UT 33 at f 18 (emphasis in original). 
At best, Jensens have made a prima facie case before the trial court that the Case 
Family Trust acquiesced in their use of land east of their record boundary line (actual 
"occupancy" not having been shown - see Point I, above). They have made no showing, 
however, of any act by or on behalf of the Case Family Trust, or its predecessors, 
acknowledging any point east of the Jensen Property's record line as the boundary. As in 
Argyle, in fact, circumstantial evidence presented to the Court established precisely the 
contrary: remnants of prior fence lines, fence lines to property immediately to the south 
of the Jensen Property, etc., all point to non-acquiescence in irrigation ditch as a 
boundary line.5 The Court's finding of mutual acquiescence in the face of such evidence 
is simply untenable. 
5
 The record contains no direct evidence concerning the payment of taxes on the Case 
Property. However, Patricia Mitchell's testimony that the deed description was taken 
from tax records clearly implies that the Case Family Trust and its predecessor in interest 
paid taxes on the described parcel. Certainly, Jensens presented no evidence to the 
contrary. The Argyle decision plainly views tax payment as an indicator of non-
acquiescence. 
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B. Jensens May Not Rely on Non-user by the Case Family Trust and its 
Predecessors to Establish Acquiescence. 
While not clearly so stated, the trial court may have relied on the fact that neither 
the Case Family Trust nor its predecessors-in-interest actively farmed land west of the 
irrigation ditch. By itself, however, this cannot rise to a finding of acquiescence in the 
ditch as a boundary line, due to the inaccessibility of property on the far side of the ditch. 
In the case of Carter v. Hanwrath, 925 P.2d 960 (Utah 1996), the Supreme Court 
reversed the trial court's finding of mutual acquiescence through non-user, by the record 
title holder, of the disputed property, given the inaccessibility of the disputed area from 
the remainder of the property: 
During their years of ownership, [the record titleholders] had no access to 
the disputed area. It was entirely landlocked. The trial court found that 
they could not access it from the remainder of their property, which was on 
the plateau above the disputed area. They did not own any adjoining tract 
from which access could be gained. Because of this inability to take 
physical possession of the disputed area, the indolence of the [owners] 
cannot be construed to be acquiescence. Their non-use must be attributed 
to their physical inability to possess the disputed area, not to their 
acquiescence in the edge of the plateau with its cliffs and ledges as the 
boundary. We should not confuse non-use because of lack of access with 
acquiescence. 
925 P.2d at 962. 
By the same token, Jensens may not rely upon the failure of the Case Family Trust 
(or its predecessors) to farm or work property west of the irrigation ditch as evidence of 
acquiescence - the ditch formed a barrier to any cultivation of property to the west 
thereof. See Affidavit of Claudia Case (R00112-0115) at ffif 8-9; Affidavit of Ronald T. 
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Ludlow (R0118-0121) at ffi[ 13, 15 and 17. Where property cannot be accessed, its non-
use carries no implication of acquiescence in ownership by another. 
C. Even if Otherwise Established, Mutual Acquiescence is Vitiated By The 
Existence of a Prior, Express Agreement Concerning the Location of 
the Boundary Line. 
The final problem with Jensens' claim of "mutual acquiescence" in the east edge 
of the irrigation ditch as the proper boundary arose before any acts which could constitute 
such "acquiescence" ever occurred. In 1941, the parties5 predecessors-in-interest 
recorded with the Utah County Recorder's Office a boundary line agreement which 
expressly established the boundary between the Case and Jensen properties, at a location 
to the west of the irrigation ditch by several feet. Affidavit of Donald Clair Allen, 
Surveyor (R0109-0112) at % 8 and Attachment 1 thereto. 
Utah law has done away with the requirement (once incumbent upon a claimant of 
boundary by acquiescence) that the true boundary lines have been the matter of objective 
uncertainty and dispute. See Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417 (Utah 1990). However, 
where the parties know and acknowledge that a physical monument is not the true 
boundary line, their acquiescence in its use as such boundary does not constitute it as 
such. In the case of Ault v. Holden, cited supra, the Court observed the following: 
When the parties agree that the line which they occupy is not the true line 
and agree subsequently to ascertain the true boundary, the quality of 
acquiescence is destroyed and no boundary is fixed by continued 
occupation. 
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2002 Utah 33, at 1fl8 (quoting 12 Andrews 2d, Boundaries, § 83 (1997)). Similarly, in 
Wilkinson Family Farm, LLC v. Babcock, cited supra, this Court clarified the holding in 
Staker, as follows: 
[Plaintiff] seems to argue that Staker not only eliminates objective 
uncertainty as an element, but renders knowledge of the true boundary 
irrelevant. This overstates Staker and fails to acknowledge the underlying 
nature of boundary by acquiescence. The 'very foundation of the doctrine 
is that the law implies that the adjoining land owners were once uncertain 
. . . and that the boundary was marked on the ground in settlement thereof. 
After the parties have for a long period of time acquiesced in that marked 
boundary, the law protects it.' Stratford v. Morgan, 689 P.2d 360, 366 
(Utah 1984) (Howe, J. dissenting). 
In contrast, "if there is no uncertainty as to the location of the true boundary 
line the parties may not, knowing where the true boundary line is, establish 
a boundary line by acquiescence at another place." Nunley v. Walker, 13 
Utah 2d 105, 369 P.2d 117, 122 (1962). 
Accordingly, knowledge of the true boundary is relevant to a determination 
of whether a party acquiesced in a particular line as the boundary. 
1999 UT App. 366 at ffif 12, 13 (emphasis in original). 
In this case, the trial court seems to have indulged in the same mis-impression as 
did the Plaintiff in Wilkinson - that a prior agreement concerning the true location of the 
boundary line (of which all parties to this action had record notice) is irrelevant in 
determining the existence of acquiescence thereafter. As the Wilkinson decision makes 
clear, boundary by acquiescence rests on the implicit absence of agreement concerning 
the true location of a boundary line; if that boundary line is established by prior 
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agreement, the implication vanishes, and no acquiescence may be found through words or 
conduct. 
The existence of the 1941 Boundary Agreement, on its face, vitiates the notion that 
conduct after 1941 could somehow relocate that boundary to the other side of the 
irrigation ditch; certainly, it raised a sufficient question of material fact to defeat summary 
judgment. 
* * * * * 
In the case of RHN Corporation v. Veibell, 2004 Utah 60, 96 P.3d 935, the Utah 
Supreme Court observed that "acquiescence is a 'highly fact-dependent question'". (2004 
UT 60 at U 24, quoting Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 1998)). In ruling that, 
as a matter of law, the parties to this action mutually acquiesced in an imaginary line one 
foot east of the eastern edge of the irrigation ditch as their common boundary, the trial 
court completely ignored the fact-sensitive nature of the determination which it was 
making; for those reasons set out above, its holding simply cannot be sustained. 
POINT III. JENSENS DEMONSTRATED NEITHER OCCUPANCY, NOR 
MUTUAL ACQUIESCENCE, FOR THE REQUISITE TWENTY-
YEAR PERIOD. 
Jensens' apparent argument in satisfaction of the requirement that occupancy and 
acquiescence in the boundary line persist for a "long period of time" (defined in 
governing case law as more than twenty years) is satisfied by the fact that they put 
concrete in the ditch more than twenty years ago, and have been taking water therefrom 
725286vl 31 
for more than twenty years. (See Factual Claims generally discussed under Point I, 
above). They further apparently argue that the Case Family Trust and its predecessor-in-
interest acquiesced in the ditch as the boundary line for more than twenty years by 
permitting them to act as they did. 
For those reasons already discussed, no conduct constituting either "occupancy" 
nor "mutual acquiescence" has been continuous for a period of twenty years. To the 
contrary, activities of the parties on their respective properties, like those of their 
predecessors-in-interest, have all occurred within the context of a boundary line 
agreement dating from 1941, expressly locating the boundary between the properties to 
the west of the irrigation ditch. The time requirement, therefore, fails as well. 
POINT IV. THE CASE PROPERTY AND THE JENSEN PROPERTY ARE, IN 
ANY EVENT, NOT "ADJOINING" 
Unrebutted evidence was presented to the trial court, by the only certified land 
surveyor offering testimony, that the record east boundary line of the Jensen Property 
does not adjoin the record west boundary line of the Case Property - that there is a "gap" 
between the two. Affidavit of Donald Clair Allen - Surveyor (R0109-0112) at \ 9. 
The trial court nowhere addressed, in its decision, the failure of this element. In 
argument, Jensens' counsel did nothing but call the failing "a spurious issue of fact" 
(R0202 at p. 7). The fact that the parcels do not adjoin, however, is fatal to the boundary 
by acquiescence claim. 
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The reason for the requirement of adjoining properties is self-evident. If neither 
the Case Family Trust nor the Jensens have record title to some portion of the disputed 
property, then the record title interests of some third party are implicated by Jensens' 
claim of boundary by acquiescence. That third party (nowhere named or joined in this 
proceeding) has no notice that his/her/its property rights are in jeopardy, and no 
opportunity to appear and defend. 
Utah case law has expressly held that, absent contiguity between the affected 
parcels, no boundary by acquiescence may arise. In Condas v. Willesen, 61A P.2d 115 
(Utah 1983), the Court rejected a claim of boundary by acquiescence based on the 
existence of an unused, dedicated, strip of land between the affected parcels, owned by 
Salt Lake County: 
The undisputed facts show that St. Johns Street separated the property 
owned by appellants from that owned by respondents through the period 
during which the appellants claim to have established a boundary by 
acquiescence. During that period of time, Salt Lake County was the fee 
simple owner of the dedicated property. Utah Ann. 1953, § 57-5-4. It is 
therefore obvious that one of the essential requirements of the doctrine of 
boundary of acquiescence - that the parties be "adjoining" 
landowners - has not been met in this case. 
674 P.2d at 115. See also Smith v. DeNiro, 25 Utah 2d 295, 480 P.2d 480 (1971) 
("without contiguity there could be no boundary by acquiescence."- 480 P.2d at 481). 
The Court should further note (again consistent with the holding in Condas) that 
the very "monument" invoked by Jensens as the boundary is itself located within an 
easement belonging neither to Jensens nor the Case Family Trust, but to the Spanish Fork 
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South Irrigation Company - which has not been joined in these proceedings. No less than 
the roadway owned by Salt Lake County in Condas, the easement breaks the "adjoining 
property owners" requirement, and defeats boundary by acquiescence. 
By invoking the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence, Jensens are attempting to 
stretch their property claim not only across property owned of record by the Case Family 
Trust, but across property owned by the Irrigation Company and some unnamed third 
party, neither of them before the Court. Every case since 1906, articulating the elements 
of boundary by acquiescence, has insisted upon the claim existing only between 
"adjoining landowners." The parties to this action are not "adjoining landowners," a fact 
placed before the trial court by the Case Family Trust, and undisputed by any evidence 
offered by Jensens. On this basis alone, the claim must fail. 
CONCLUSION 
No policy underlying the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence is served by its 
application in this case. This is not a situation where owners of contiguous, adjoining 
parcels of land, uncertain over the actual boundary of their properties, have by mutual 
acquiescence established a boundary line to which they both consent. It is, rather, an 
attempted land-grab by Jensens, over an easement owned by a third party and a strip of 
land owned by yet another, unnamed and unknown party, based on nothing more than the 
lining of an irrigation ditch, extraction of irrigation water therefrom, and the fact that the 
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Case Family Trust and its predecessors-in-interest could not plow on the far side of an 
irrigation ditch located within their record boundaries. 
Even on its face, the Jensens' evidence before the trial court was insufficient to 
make out any, much less all, of the four elements required for a finding of boundary by 
acquiescence. When viewed in conjunction with countervailing evidence presented on 
behalf of the Case Family Trust, the court's ruling granting summary judgment was 
clearly improper - this matter should have been tried, and should now be remanded for 
that purpose. 
DATED this 5th day of January, 2006. 
JONES WALDO HO^ROOK & MCDONOUGH PC 
By: 
incent C. Rampton 
Attorneys for Petitioners/Appellants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Docketing Statement was mailed via first class mail, postage prepaid, to the following 
this 5th day of January, 2006: 
Harold D. Mitchell 
Attorney at Law 
324 North Main Street 
Spanish Fork, UT 84660 
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EXHIBIT 1 
Harold D. Mitchell (#2276) 
Attorney for Defendants 
324 North Main Street 
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660 
Telephone: (801)798-3574 
Facsimile: (801)798-3576 
IN FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
G&C CASE FAMILY TRUST, GORDON 
CASE and CLAUDIA CASE, Trustees, 
Petitioners, 
-v-
RONALD JENSEN and GERALDINE 
JENSEN, 
Respondents. 
The court having made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
in the matter, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Respondents are entitled as a matter of law to a judgment and decree 
determining that the east bank of the irrigation ditch is the boundary between the land of 
respondents and the land of petitioners. 
2. The east bank of the irrigation ditch is more particularly described as follows: 
Beginning at a point on the south line of the parcel owned by Ronald S. 
Jensen and Geraldine B. Jensen as described as Parcel 4 in the deed dated 
February 8, 1999, and recorded February 8, 1999, as Entry No. 15109, 
Book 4968, Page 256, records of Utah County Recorder, which point is 
North 89°35'13" East 2774.44 feet along the quarter section line and 
South 385.48 feet from the West Vi corner of Section 29, Township 8 
South, Range 2 East, Salt Lake Base & Meridian; thence East 10.23 feet 
along the south boundary of said parcel to a point on the east bank of an 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
Case No. 030404224 
Judge Gary Stott 
irrigation ditch; North 0°50'13" East 678.40 feet along the east bank of the 
irrigation ditch to the north line of the parcel owned by Gordon Case and 
Claudia Case, Trustees of the G&C Family Trust, as described in the deed 
dated September 12, 2002, and recorded September 13, 2002, as Entry 
107659:2002, records of Utah County Recorder. 
Basis of bearing is Utah Coordinate System 1927 Central Zone (North 
89°35' 13" East between the West % corner and the East lA corner of 
Section 29, Township 8 South, Range 2 East, SLB&M). 
3. The line described in paragraph 2 is the boundary between the land of 
petitioners and the land of respondents. Petitioners are the owners on the east side of that 
line. Respondents are the owners of the land on the west side of that line. 
4. Respondents shall record a certified copy of this order in the office of the Utah 
County Recorder. 
Dated: -T^ll-D^
 y2fwT ^ ^ ^ ' ^ 
Approved as to form: 
Mark N. Brian 
Attorney for Petitioners 
Gftr3r©r£tot%Di^ ;f 
EXHIBIT 2 
Harold D. Mitchell (#2276) 
Attorney for Respondents 
324 North Main Street 
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660 
Telephone: (801)798-3574 
Facsimile: (801)798-3576 
FILED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
rP> Uft? Deputy 
IN FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICTG COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
G&C CASE FAMILY TRUST, GORDON 
CASE and CLAUDIA CASE, Trustees, 
Petitioners, 
RONALD JENSEN and 
GERALDINE JENSEN, 
Respondents. 
ORDER DENYING 
PETITIONERS' MOTION TO 
AMEND FINDINGS, 
CONCLUSIONS AND 
JUDGMENT 
Case No. 030404224 
Judge Gary D. Stott 
On February 17,2005, the court entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and a Judgment and Order. Petitioners filed a motion pursuant to Rule 52(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure to alter or amend the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Judgment and Order. Petitioners filed a Memorandum in support of the motion. 
Respondents opposed the motion and filed a Memorandum in opposition. Petitioners 
filed a rebuttal Memorandum and a Notice to Submit for Decision. Neither party 
requested oral argument on the motion. The matter was submitted to the Honorable Gary 
D. Stott, District Judge, for decision. Having considered the points and authorities raised 
by the parties in the several memoranda, and good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBYORDERED as follows: 
0132 
1. There are no genuine disputed issues of material fact and respondents are 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
2. Petitioners have not raised any issues or law or fact that required amendment 
of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order and Judgment heretofore entered 
by the court. 
3. Petitioners* motion dated March 4, 2005, to Alter or Amend the Findings of 
Pursuant to Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the foregoing order will be 
submitted to the court for signature unless and objection to the order is made within five days 
after service of this order. 
Harold D. Mitchell 
Mailing Certificate 
I hereby certify that on June 13 , 2005,1 mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Order and Notice to counsel for petitioners by depositing the same in the United States 
mail, first class postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Mark N. Brian 
Attorney at Law 
P. O. Box 173 
8124 South 3200 West 
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660 
Harold D. Mitchell 
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EXHIBIT 3 
Harold D. Mitchell (#2276) 
Attorney for Defendants 
324 North Main Street 
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660 
Telephone: (801)798-3574 
Facsimile: (801)798-3576 
IN FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
Si M L ul UTAH 
G&C CASE FAMILY TRUST, GORh ) 
CASE and CLAUDIA CASE, Trust. 
) FINDINGS OF FACT 
Petitioners, ) CONCLUSIONS OF! . 
-v- ) Case No. 030404224 
RONALD JENSEN and GERALDINE ) Judge Gary Stott 
JENSEN, ) 
" mcknh ) 
Respondents' motion for summary judgment was heard by the court on November 
29, 2004, before the Honorable Gary I > I Holt, l^isti ict Judge. , eutioners were 
represented by Mark N. Brian. Respondents were represented by Har^H <» 1»> .1. 
The court reviewed the affidavits and memoranda filed by the parties regarding the 
motion and heard the argument of counsel for the parties. Based on the affidavits filed 
with the court, the court makes the following FINDINGS OF FACT: 
1. Respondents own land located at 3535 South 7550 West, Benianr I 
referred to hereafter as the "Jensen Land". 
2. Petitioners own land adjacent to and along the east boundary of fl land owned 
by respondents, referred 'i t:,.-,• ine "Case Land 
•i •• < d | O I I I I I I ^ I . l l l l l 
9 n 
0/fia 
4. An irrigation ditch has been in place along the north/south boundary between 
the Jensen Land and the Case Land for more than 100 years. The irrigation ditch was 
lined with concrete in 1967 and the ditch has been in its present location and alignment 
since at least that date. 
5. Respondents have occupied and used the land west of and to the east bank of 
the ditch. Since at least 1967, respondents and their predecessors in interest have used 
the ditch and land to the east bank of the ditch for residential and agricultural purposes. 
Respondents and their predecessors in interest have not used or occupied any land east of 
the east bank of the ditch. 
6. Petitioners have occupied and used the land east of and to the east bank of the 
ditch. Since at least 1967, petitioners and their predecessors have used the land east of 
and to the east bank of the ditch for agricultural purposes. Petitioners and their 
predecessors in interest have not used or occupied any land west of the east bank of the 
ditch. 
7. Respondents and their predecessors in interest and petitioners and their 
predecessors in interest have mutually acquiesced in the east bank of the ditch as the 
boundary between the Jensen Land and the Case Land. 
From the foregoing, the court draws the following CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
1. There are no genuine disputed issues of material fact and respondents are 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
2. The east bank of the irrigation ditch is a visible line marking the boundary 
between the Jensen Land and the Case Land. 
I II III mi lull 1 ni t >i i i i i i l I h e n p i e d o < e s s c u » In n t i in i i l i i illll'i i i | i n u s u ill i n III iill I n n ii l l i i 
boundary between the Jensen Land and the Case Land 
.^quiescence in the boundai > vi as foi more than 20 years. 
\11 of the elements of boundary be acquiescence have been proven 
Respondents are entitled to an order and judgment estal: lishing the east bank of 
the irrigation ditch as the boundary between the Jensen Land and the < 
Appn 
'$:?:?£<£$ 
Mark N. Brian 
Attorney for Petitioners 
EXHIBIT 4 
4TH D , COURT 
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Jul !o 4 54 PH % Vincent C. Rampton (USB 2684) JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & MCDON( >l K.! I !'< 
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-3200 
Fax:(801)328-0537 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
G&C CASE FAMILY TRUST, GORD^* 
and CLAUDIA CASE, Trustees, 
™ ntiff, 
RONALD JENSEN & GERALDINE 
JENSEN, 
Pefeu<..i;i! <: 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. 030404224 
Judge Gary D. Stott 
Division 4 
Plaintiff G&C Case Family Trust (Gordon and Claudia Case Trustees), by counsel, 
h rt'hv apprals in (lie I Hull Mnipiciiin I '"uiirt Irani the lual court's final order denying Petitioners' 
Motion to Amend Conclusions and Judgment in the above-entitled action rnfi-
* ^ . D\U!! . ,. j y day of July, 2005 
.„ HjOi BR-
pton 
Defendants 
704059vl 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of 
Appeal was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following this / t*^ nay of July, 2005: 
Harold D. Mitchell 
324 North Main Street 
Spanish Fork, UT 84660 
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